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October 10, 1986 Conference
List 4, Sheet 1
No. 86-5324-CSY
Griffin (subjected to
warrantless search)

v.

Cert to: Supreme Court of
Wisconsin (~for the court;
Abrahamson, diss.; Bablitch,
diss.)

Wisconsin

State/Criminal

1.
cers may

SUMMARY:
~h

Timely

Petr challenges decision that probation offihis

~e

without a warrant

if

they have

"reasonable grounds to believe" that he is violating a condition
of his probation.
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FACTS

AND

PROCEEDINGS

BELOW:

Petr

was

convicted

in

state court of the misdemeanors of resisting arrest, disorderly

...-------..___

conduct, and obstructing an officer.
tion for those offenses.

Petr was placed on proba-

During petr's third year of probation,

a probation supervisor, Michael Lew, received a call from a police detective that petr "may have had guns in his apartment."
Although Lew believed the source of information was a captain at
the Detective Bureau,

that captain later
Le~

not believe he had called
by one of his detectives.
petr's probation officer.
went

to

search

officers.

petr 's

but the call may have been placed

r..Jew

~ ted

two or

three hours

for

Then he and another probation officer

apartment,

Lew explained

testified that he did

that

--

accompanied

·-·
___,
by three

police

the police officers were brought

along in order to protect the two probation officers.
Upon arriving at petr's apartment,
they were and
residence.
a

informed petr that they were going to search his

One of the police officers apparently pointed toward

table with a broken drawer

drawer.

Lew informed petr who

that exposed the contents of the

Lew found a gun in the drawer, handed the gun over to

the police, and directed the officers to arrest petr for a probation

violation.

The other

probation officer

found

and

seized

marijuana lying on a table.
Petr was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon
and possession of a controlled substance.

The trial court denied

petr's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.
The court held

that a probation officer did not need a search

warrant to engage in a search of a probationer's residence, but

- 3 -

rather must act reasonably in making such a search.
concluded that the search
the

evidence.

The

The court

in this case was reasonable based on

trial court

further

found,

as a rna t ter of

fact, that the search was not a ,police search and that the police
officers were present solely to protect the probation officers.
Petr was convicted and sentenced to a term of two years.
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed.

~he

It concluded that

a probation officer may conduct a a warrantless search of a probationer1s · residence even if the search does not meet one of the
usual

exceptions

to

the

search is reasonable.
police

constituted

warrant

requirement,

as

long

as

the

The court concluded that the tip from the

reasonable

grounds

to

believe

that

petr 1s

residence contained contraband.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.
neither it, nor the

u.s.

The court noted that

Supreme Court, had ever recognized that

an exception to the warrant requirement could be based on a person 1s

probationary

status.

Nevertheless,

that such an exception was warranted.
was ample
courts

authority among

for

conduct

federal

~he

the

court

concluded

court noted that there

courts of appeals and

state

the viewpoint that probation or parole officers may

warrantless

searches

of

a

probationer 1s

or

parolee 1s

residence, although it noted that there was also some authority
for

the viewpoint that a

(citing cases).
that

the

privacy

war rant was necessary.

Pet. App. A5

The court stated that it had already recognized

nature of probation places
interests

of

probationers.

limits on the liberty and
See

Wis.2d 647, 653-654, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976)

State

v.

Tarrell,

74

("Conditions of proba-

- 4 tion must at times limit the constitutional freedoms of the probationer.
sible as
related

Necessary infringements on these freedoms are permislong as they are not overly broad and are reasonably

to the person's

rehabilitation.")

A probation officer

has the dual role of assisting in rehabilitating the probationer
and protecting the public, and this creates a special relationship between the officer and the probationer.
special relationship,
cannot be
search

"'the law relating

Because of this

to probation searches

strictly governed by automatic reference to ordinary

and

seizure

law.'"

Pet.

App.

A6

(citation

omitted).

Rather, a court must balance the probationer's right to privacy
against

the

probationer

probation

system's

interest

in

ensuring

is complying with probation conditions.

that
Based

the
"on

the nature of probation," the court concluded that "a probation
agent who reasonably believes that a probationer is violating the
terms of probation may conduct a warrantless search of a probationer's residence."

Pet. App. A7.

The court then turned to the standard that should govern
the agent's belief.

It concluded that the standard must be less

than "probable cause," and

is met when the officer has "reason-

able grounds" to believe the probationer is violating a condition
of probation.

That is the standard established by a Wisconsin

Dept. of Health and Human Services rule, which allows probation
agents to search a probationer's residence "if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the quarters
band."

• contain contra-

The court concluded that this formulation met the consti-

tutional standard of reasonableness.

- 5 -

Last, the court concluded that Lew had "reasonable grounds"
to search petr's home on the basis of the police tip.

In addi-

tion, it noted that the record supported the trial court's finding that this was not a police search, and that the police assistance was solely for protection of the probation officers.
Justice Abrahamson dissented.

She agreed that probationers

have a different expectation of privacy than other citizens and
that probation officers must have some latitude if they are to
exercise

their

disagreed
aside.

supervisory responsibilities.

Nevertheless,

she

that the warrant requirement could be so easily cast

A probation officer should be allowed to search a proba-

tioner's home if the officer has
the probationer

is violating a

"reasonable cause" to believe

condition of probation and

be-

lieves that evidence of the violation will be found in the home
'~....__....- '

to

be

searched.

'Evidentiary

support

for

the

reasonable cause

standard need not meet the standards of Illinois v. Gates,
rather

should be

flexible.

The

but ·

issuance of a warrant on this

kind of showing would not be an undue burden on the officer and
would provide
addition,

this

the

required protection for

warrant

requirement

would

the probationer.
not

impede

the

In
dual

goals of probation, that ofprotecting the public and rehabilitating the probationer.

Justice Abrahamson added that, even if she

agreed with the majority that no warrant was needed, she would
dissent on the grounds that the facts of this case did not even
meet the "reasonable grounds" standard set out by the majority.
Justice Bablitch dissented on the latter ground raised by
Justice Abrahamson.

He noted

that the only basis

for the war-

-

6 -

rantless search in this case was the supervisor's testimony that
some detective
apartment."

told

him that petr

"may have

had

guns

in his

There was no evidence as to which detective phoned

in this information, the source of the detective's information,
or

any other

fact

that

indicated

the probation supervisor

reason to believe petr had anything to do with guns.
these

facts,

even

the majority's

minimal

test of

had

Based on

"reasonable

grounds" was not met.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr first argues that there is signifi-

cant split in the federal courts of appeals and the highest state
courts as to whether a warrant must be obtained before searching
a

probationer's

residence.

Numerous courts have

ruled

that a

probation officer must get a warrant before searching a probationer's home, while other courts have decided the issue to the
contrary.

Pet. 9-10, citing cases (also, see Discussion below).

This Court should grant cert to resolve the conflict.
Petr

next

contends

that

the

decision

by

the

Wisconsin

Supreme Court is in conflict with controlling principles of law
announced by this Court.
589-590

(1980),

In Payton v. New York,

445

u.s.

573,

the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment

"has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house" and that
"absent exigent circumstances that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant."
cloth

and with

no supporting

The Wise. S.Ct.,
authority

from

"out of whole

this Court,"

has

improperly created a "probationer" exception to the normal requirement that a warrant must be obtained before a person's resi-:t

dence is/searched.

In addition,

even if a warrant were not re-

- 7 qui red,

the state court erred

in concluding that a standard of

"reasonable grounds to believe," rather than the stricter standard of probable cause,

is sufficient to justify a search by a

probation agent.
Finally,
case

did

not

petr
even

contends

that

meet

minimal

the

the

facts

presented

standard

of

in this

"reasonable

grounds to believe" established by the Wise. s.ct.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr

is correct that there

the federal and state courts on this issue.
deal

with parolees

is a split in

Although some cases

and others with probationers,

a

number

of

courts have stated that the two groups should be considered as
presenting similar questions
ment.

See,

(CAS 1982):
1980).

I

for

purposes of the Fourth Amend-

e.g., United States v.
State v. Earnest,

Scott,

678 F.2d 32,

293 N.W.2d 365,

368 n.

2

33 n.l
(Minn.

think this is probably correct, particularly for pur-

poses of evaluating the significance of the lower court split.l
One of

the

Latta v.

first cases

Fitzharris,

denied, 423 U.S. 897

to deal with this

521 F.2d
(1975).

246

(cA(

issue at length was

975)

(en bane),

cert.

In that case, the court rejected a

previously long-standing view that parolees have almost no Fourth
Amendment

rights

(citing

Morissev

v.

Brewster,

408

u.s.

471

(1972) as evincing greater protection for parolees), but conclud-

1 Nevertheless, for those who may feel that this distinction
does present a real difference for purposes of the lower court
split, I note after each case the area it deals with.
(Both petr
and the Wise. s.ct. omitted this information in their case
citations, as they concluded it was unnecessary.)

- 8 -

ed that the "special relationship" between the parole officer and
the

parolee meant

that

parole

officers

should

be

allowed

to

search without a warrant, as long as the search was reasonable.
A number of highest state courts adopted the Latta reasoning and
result, with some articulating various standards as to what would
constitute

a

"reasonable"

basis

for

a

search.

Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975)
v. Huntley,

43 N.Y.2d 175, 371 N.E.2d 794, 796

See People

(parole): People
(1977)

State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d at 368-369 (Minn. 1980)
State v.

Pinson,

657 P.2d 1095, 1099-1101

tion):

State v. Velasque,

role):

State v. Fields,

(parole):

(probation):

(Idaho 1983)

672 P.2d 1088, 1094

v.

(proba-

(Utah 1983)

686 P.2d 1379, 1389-1390

(pa-

(Hawaii 1984)

(probation: must have "specific and articulable" grounds).

One

other federal circuit court of appeals has followed Latta.

See

United States v.

Scott,

678 F.2d at 34-35

need a "reasonable suspicion").

(CAS 1982)

(parole;

Some of these courts have empha-

sized that police officers do not have the same right to search
without a warrant, but that police may accompany parole or probation officers if necessary for assistance.

See, e.g., Anderson,

536 P.2d at 305: Pinson, 657 P.2d at 1101.
Other courts have held that a warrant is required in order
to search the home of a probationer or parolee.
State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537
398

u.s.

938

An early case,

(Iowa 1970), cert. denied,

(1970), stated flatly that parolees have the same

Fourth Amendment rights as other citizens.

Later cases, decided

after Latta, have usually referred to that CA9 decision and have
explicitly

rejected

the Latta

approach.

See United States v.

-

Bradley,

571 F.2d 787,

789

9 -

(CA4 1978)

(parole; accepts Justice

Hufstedler's dissent in Latta); United States v. Rea,
382, 387-388 (CA2 1982)

678 F.2d

(probation; requiring an officer to get a

warrant does not significantly interfere with the dual rehabilitative

and

State v.

law enforcement

Fogarty,

functions of probation).

610 P.2d 140, 152

(1980)

See also

(probation officer

must get a warrant to protect the privacy of third parties who
may be living with the probationer).

Other cases, also cited by

petr as upholding the warrant requirement, ar~ a bit more equ i vocal.

See 'ramez v.

(condition

State,

in probation

534

that

s.~'l.2d

allowed

686,
for

691-692

(Tex. 1976)

searches without any

probable cause and without any basis for suspicion is too broad);
State

v.

Culberson,

563 P.2d

1224,

1227-1229

(Or.

1\pp.

1977)

(search must be based on either probable cause or a condition of
probation in which probationer has consented to certain searches).

See also United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 833

1983)

(en bane)

(CA3

(holds . that exclusionary rule does not apply to

probation revocation hearing; in dicta, states that special features of probation system do not also mean that a probationer is
not protected by the warrant requirement, citing Rea.)

In gener-

al, courts that have upheld the warrant requirement have acknowledged the special features and needs of probation or parole systems,

but have concluded that the warrant requirement does not

interfere with those needs so significantly that a court is justified in removing the warrant protection for parolees or probationers.

- 10 On the merits ot this
may disagree.

issue,

I

am sure reasonable people

The Court has recognized only a few exceptions to

the warrant requirement, ~d it -is arguable whether - the- riaeure of
probationary or
exception.

-

------.

parole

status

Regardless of

should constitute

the merits,

some of the usual criteria for

however,

an

additional

the case meets

The issue is

a ~neric

one of law, not connected to any factbound analysis, and it will
~

probably arise with some frequency given the extensive systems of
parole and probation in this country.
courts are split on the issue.

In addition,

Although the Wise. s.ct. conclud-

ed that the weight of authority conformed with
that no warrant is required

the lower

its conclusion

(thus perhaps allowing this Court to

deny cert so as to let all other courts arrive at this same conclusio, on their own), I am not confident that the split will be
resolved that easily.

The two federal circuits that have spoken

most recently on the issue, CAS in Scott and CA2 in Rea (both in
1982), have arrived at opposite conclusions.
other

than CA9

question.

(and CA3

in dicta),

The other circuits,

have not yet

ruled on the

Thus, this may be an issue on which the Court's guid-

ance will be needed.
I do not think that this particular case presents any significant problems, in terms ot being a vehicle for review of the
issue.

As one can see from a review of the lower court opinions,

most have dealt with parolees rather than probationers.

Although

I do not think the constitutional analysis should differ significantly for the two groups, the Court may wish to wait for a parolee case.

There is also a related question that arises in some

of these cases and is not presented here.

That regards whether a

probation or parole agreement may contain a condition in which
the individual consents to certain warrantless searches, under a
specified standard of reasonableness.

(Such a

condition may be

valid even if warrants would otherwise be required.)

Thus, the

Court may have to decide the threshold issue of a probationer's
Fourth Amendment rights in a case such as this one, and address
the validity of conditions in a second case.

Alternatively, the

Court could wait for a case that presented the use of a condition
in a probation or parole agreement.
Because this case is a possible candidate for

a grant, 1

recommend calling for a response.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend CFR.

There is no response.

October l, 1986

Feldblum
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From:
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN v. WISCONSIN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN
No. 86-5324.

Decided December-, 1986

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
This case presents the question whether the home of a
probationer may be searched without complying with the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that such a search is permissible if the
probation officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a
condition of probation ~d. --Wis. 2d - - ,
388 N. W. 2d 535 (1986). There is considerable authority for )
such a rule in cases dealing with probationers ~rolees.
See, e. g., United States v. Scott, 6~ . 2d 32 ~ 1982);
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F. 2d 246 (~ (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 897 (1975); State v. Earnest, 293 N. W. 2d 365
(Minn. 1980) .. However, there is also coEfl..!_ct_!_f!.~t~rity.1
See, e. g., Umted States v. Rhea, 678 F.]Cf'J721@11982);
United States v. Bradley, 571 F. 2d 787 (~ 1978); Tamez v.
State, 534 S. W. 2d 686 (Tex. 1976); State v. Fogarty, 610 P.
2d 140 (Montana 1980). I would grant certiorari to resolve
this recurring conflict on an issue of obvious practical
· significance.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

March 27, 1986

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Andy

Re:

No. 86-5324, Griffin v. State of Wisconsin

Oral Argument: Monday April 20, 1987 (3d case)
Cert to the Wisconsin S. Ct.

(Day, with 2 dissents)

QUESTION PRESENTED
The issue is whether a probation officer's warrantless
search of a

probationer's home violates

when the officer has

reasonable grounds

probation violation has occurred.

the

4th Amendment

to suspect that a

2.

I. BACKGROUND
In
state

1980

court

petitioner
of

Joseph

disorderly

obstructing an officer.

Griffin

conduct,

was

convicted

resisting

arrest,

in
and

He was placed on probation for an

unspecified number of years.

The Wisconsin probation stat-

ute places numerous restrictions on a probationer's rights;
it provides, for example, that:
"A ~ rch _!:?J a client, a ~lient's living gua! ters,
or property may be made at any_ time, ... if there
are "t easonable grouna s '' to beli eve that the quarters ~r pro ~ e ?t y contain contraband." HHS 328.21;
see Resp Brief 3 (text of s~ atute ).

In 1983, a supervisor for the State Bureau of Probation,

one Michael

Lew,

was

informed by a

local

policeman

that petr "may have had guns" at his residence, in violation

-------..-

of the terms of his probation.

Lew and a second probation

officer went to Griffin's apartment to investigate, accompanied

by

three

should petr

policemen

resist.

who

were

Upon arrival,

to

provide

protection

the probation officers

knocked, identified themselves, and informed petr that they
were there to search the apartment.
small bag of marijuana and a

The search uncovered a

istol.

Griffin was arrested

and charged with possession of a handgun by a felon

( petr

previously had been convicted of a serious drug offense).
Before trial Griffin moved to suppress the gun, arguing
that the probation officers were required to obtain a warrant before searching a private home.

The tc denied the

motion, and petr eventually was convicted and sentenced to
two years in prison.

The Wise. Ct. App. affirmed, agreeing

3.

'
that the warrant

requirement does not apply when the horne

belongs to a person on probation.

J.A. 77.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that
"by its nature, probation places limitations on the liberty
and privacy

------

rights

of

probationers,

and

these

limitations

-------~

justify an exception to the warrant requirement."

Id., 100.

The court found that if probation officers were required to
obtain a

warrant

before

searching,

it would

significantly

impair their ability to supervise the probationer's conduct.
The court also found that the unique characteristics of probation justified the State's decision to lower the degree of
suspicion
grounds"
Id.,

at

required,
to believe

113.

from

"probable

cause"

to

"reasonable

that probationer possessed contraband.

Finally,

the

court

concluded

that

on

these

facts, the tip by the police provided reasonable grounds for
~

---

the search.

There were two dissenting opinions.
agreed

that

the

State

could

.......,"'Dl';ga;

Justice Abrahamson

allow searches

based

~~ ~
~

~

on mere

reasonable suspicion, but argued that a warrant still should ~ _

.u

be required.

She claimed that the warrant requirement

not interfere with the probation officers'

wou~

supervisory du- ~~

ties but would provide some protection for the probationer. ~;L
Justice Bablitch also dissented, claiming that here the

of- ~~

ficers did not have reasonable grounds to search.
This Court granted cert.
a

----

(WB, BRW, HAB, LFP) to resolve

conflict among state and federal

courts.

The Wisconsin

court had recognized that its decision was consistent with

4.

,
the majority view on

this

issue,

although

it acknowledged

that several cases had reached a contrary conclusion.

See

id., 106-107 (listing cases).

II. DISCUSSION
Griffin challenges three aspects of the
First,
been

he

claims

required

apartment.

that

to

the

obtain

probation
a

warrant

ruling below.

officers
before

should

searching

have
the

Second, even if there is no warrant requirement,

it was error to allow the search based on a standard lower
than probable cause.

Finally,

the information available to

the probation officers in this case did not satisfy either
the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion standard.
A. Prerequisites for a Search
The

most

important

question

is

whether

the

probation

officers were required to obtain a warrant and/or have probable

cause

before

conducting

the

search.

Griffin's

best

argument is that both should be required because the search
took place in a private home.
interferes
also
home.

with

with

the

those

of

This type of search not only

probationer's
his

family

and

privacy
friends

interests,
who

share

but
the

This Court has made it clear that "physical entry of

the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
4th amendment is directed," United States v.

United States

District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), and that "[a]bsent
exigent circumstances,
reasonably be

th[e]

threshold [of a home]

crossed without

a

war rant."

may not

Payton v.

New

5.

,
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
"?u)

alleged

that

there

Here the State has not even

--

were

-

exigent circumstances.
Instead,
.....
petr argues, the Wisconsin court created an exception out of
'\..

whole cloth, based solely on the view that petr's probationary status justified the lower level of protection.
Griffin argues that there is no support in this Court's
cases for

this novel exception.

Unlike other exigent cir-

cumstances, the fact that petr is on probation does not ere-

--------------

ate the need for immediate, warrantless action to prevent an
See Welsh v. United
States,

466

u.s.

740,

749-750

(1984)

("the

police

bear

a

heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need
that might justify warrantless searches or arrests"
sis added)).

The lack of urgency in this case

from the

that Mr.

fact

(empha-

is evident

Lew waited several hours after

re-

ceiving the tip before carrying out the search.
Griffin

concedes

that

this

Court

also

has

recognized

exceptions to the warrant requirement that are not based on
exigent circumstances.
probationer's
such an exception.
523,

fails

But he claims that the search of a
to meet the criteria for

In Camera v.

United

States,

creating
387

(1967), the Court stated:
"In assessing whether the public interest demands
creation of a general exception to the ... warrant
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifi~s the type of search in question, but whether - the authority to search should
be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends
in part upon · whether ·the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely - to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind .~he search." Id., at 533.

u.s.

6.

See

also

New

Jersey

v.

T.L.O.,

469

U.S.

(citing Camera test with approval).
Griffin argues,

that

the

petr

delayed

(1985)

In this type of case,

it would not place any burden on the probato obtain a warrant before

officers might have
possessed

the

340

-----------------------------------searching.

tion officers
though

325,

contraband,

search or

would be destroyed.

good

created

it
a

reasons
would

risk

for

not

that

believing

have

the

Even

unduly

contraband

The only added burden would be that the

probation officers would have to explain the basis for their
suspicion to a magistrate,

thus deterring searches that are

designed to harass, or used as a pretext for routine criminal investigations.
nee- ~~ ~

Griffin also claims that even if a warrant is not
essary,

the 4th amendment still requires that the search be

--

based on probable cause.

In other cases where

this Court

has permitted warrantless searches, it normally continues to
demand

that

the

See,

e.g.,

need

probable

bile) .

police

Chambers v.
cause

meet

the

Maroney,

for

probable

399

u.s.

warrantless

On the other hand,

cause

42

search

standard.

(1970)

(police

of

automo-

an

in those cases where the Court

has allowed searches based on less than probable cause,

the

searches tend to be both necessary to meet a crucial state
need, and also quite limited in scope.
Ohio,

392

u.s.

1

(1969);

See, e.g., ~Terry v.

United States v.

442 U.S. 873, 880-881 (1975)

~ rignoni-Ponce,

(LFP opinion, permitting brief

stops of cars near Mexican border if officers have
able

suspicion

that

they

contain

illegal

aliens).

reasonThese

7.

decisions clearly are distinguishable,

given that here

the

probation officers conducted a generalized search of petr's
entire apartment.
I am partially persuaded by these arguments.

I

agree

that warrantless searches of a horne should be presumptively
unconstitutional, and that the warrant requirement normally
will not
that

it

impose
would

while there
for

the

such a

heavy burden on probation officers

frustrate

the

purpose

of

the

search.

And

is no direct support in this Court's precedent

decision below,

the

State

and

the

SG

(as

amicus)

nevertheless claim that the Wisconsin court was justified in
creating an exception for a probationers.
the

legal

status of a

They argue that

person on probation is

sufficiently

different from those of other citizens to justify different
4th amendment treatment.
First, the State correctly points out that a probationer has a lower expectation of privacy than others.

By defi-

nition, petr has been convicted of a crime, and although he
is not in prison,

he is considered "in custody" under Wis-

consin law.

Stat. Ann.

Wis.

§973.10.

In exchange for not

being imprisoned, a probationer may be subject to all sorts
of limitations that would be unconstitutional if applied to
non-probationers.

He

may

be

ordered

to

live

places, avoid associating with certain people,
certain types of occupations,

in

certain

refrain from

undergo periodic physical or

psychological testing, and seek permission to leave the jurisdiction.

See SG Brief 15.

Significantly, the probation-

~~

8.

er also may be subject to periodic, unannounced home visits
by his probation officer, who must carefully scrutinize the
probationer's conduct to make sure that he complies with the
terms imposed by the trial court.

Cf.,

Petr Brief 19

( ac-

y'

knowledging __!h~~ ~ rantless home visits a .:.=_ permissible).
Simply because a probationer has a lower expectation of
privacy, of course, does not mean a fortiori that the State
is excused from the warrant requirement.

The State admits

that a probationer is entitled to those 4th amendment rights
that

are

legal
that

not

fundamentally

status.

Therefore,

warrantless

inconsistent
the

searches

State's

based

serve an important state function,
dispensable
supervise

part

the

of

the

probation

probationer.

The

on

with

second

his

special

argument

reasonable

is

suspicion

because they are an inofficer's
claims

authority

that

state

to
and

federrl probation -~a~erve two purposes: assist the rehabilitation of the offender, and protect society from further
crime.
goals

He makes a persuasive argument that both of these
are

furthered

by allowing warrantless

searches.

If

the probationer knows that his supervising officer may make
an unannounced search at any time,

he will be less tempted

to violate the terms of his parole by having contraband at
his

residence.

(CAll 1982).

See Owens v.
If

Kelley,

681

F.2d 1362,

1367

the State were prohibited from searching

until it had probable cause, it would be easier for the probationer to avoid detection,
into a

and thus easier to drift back

pattern of crime by bringing drugs or weapons

into

~/-.;.

9.

his home.
nel

The fear of discovery,

it is argued, helps chan-

the offender's energy into more

rehabilitative activi-

ties.
The

need

to

spot

criminal

tendencies

develope clearly is a significant one.
recent Rand Corp.
tioners
months

in

rested.

The

they

The SG notes that a

study revealed that over half the proba-

California

of being

before

were

sentenced,

State

claims

charged with
and over
that

crimes

within

two-thirds were

this

high

recidivist

~

40

rearrate

provides ample justification for a state statute that conditions a defendant's release on his willingness to accept a
diminution of 4th amendment rights.
allowed

to

impose

these

If the States are not

conditions,

it

is

argued,

trial

judges will face the difficult choice of sending an offender
to

prison

who

otherwise

United States v.

might

have

Consuelo-Gonzales,

received

parole,

521 F. 2d 259,

266

see
(CAS

1975), or granting parole, knowing that it will be difficult
for the probation department to supervise the terms of the
release.
I

therefore

think

the

State

is

correct

in

asserting

that "reasonable grounds" is a more appropriate standard in
this type of case than probable cause.
vinced that the n

But I am less con-

because the State presents

little evidence that it would be an undue burden to obtain a
searching.

~

e also justifies an excep-

tion to the

warrant before

~-s

The

fact

that

a

search may be

/3 t-1--

c.,~l

~~

~~

w/'D

carried out on less than probable cause certainly does not ~
c.~

10.

Cour~n:isting

prevent this

ment be honored.
307

See Marshall v.

Barlow's Inc.,

U.S. ~

436

~.

(prohibiting warrantless searches of commercial -

( 1978)

premises under OSHA) .
sence

that the warrant require-

in searches of a

Since time often is not of the e sprobationer's

residence,

and

since

/-t.r /Je._

~

the "reasonable grounds" standard will not be a significant
barrier to obtaining warrants when they are needed,
the

best

result

is

to

retain

the

warrant

I think

requirement

for

this type of search.
I

recognize,

however,

that there are legitimate argu -

ments for disposing of the warrant requirement entirely.
suspect

t ~there

1s

less

reason

to

fear

that

I

probation

officers will abuse the right to search than if the police
were

given

have

little

this

power.

reason

Probation

to harass or

officers

normally will

intimidate a

probationer,

given that most officers probably do not have enough time to
handle their regular case work.

Moreover, the officers are

not given unbridled discretion in deciding when to search; ,
the Wisconsin
lines

to

statute

instruct

provides

probation

grounds" are present.

relatively

officers

on

detailed
when

guide-

"reasonable

See HHS 328.21(7); see also §.21(5)

("Field staff shall strive to preserve the dignity of elients

in all

statute

also

searches conducted under this
requires

advanced notice

of

the

that

the

searches

officers

-

section").

give

"whenever

The

probationers

feasible,"

( al -

though it is hard to imagine that it will ever be feasible
to give notice for contraband searches).

Finally, although

7

J

~

11.

the state does not advance the argument,
the warrant
in

requirement could frustrate

conducting

hopes

to

it is likely that

frequent

deter

If

searches.

criminal

conduct

searches in a single day or week,

the state
a

by

interest

probation

officer

conducting

several

inevitably he will end up

spending most of his time preparing warrant affidavits and
appearing before a magistrates.

(This problem is worse for

federal

cannot

probation officers,

who

obtain warrants

at

all, Fed R. Crim. P. 41(a),

(h), and therefore would have to

depend

of

Thus,

on

the

while

I

assistance

law

think the warrant

enforcement

personnel.)

requirement is preferable,

it may be that the minuscule benefits of requiring a warrant
are outweighed by the interference it creates.
B. Were There Reasonable Grounds Here?
Griffin's
officer

only

final
needed

claim

is

that

Jl

•

reasonable

possession

source

to

the

of

the

police

probation department.
reliability of the
the

tipster

Moreover,

had

the

There

was

t

probation

search,

0

the

by

then
no

an

unidentified

relayed

attempt

to

it

to

the

check

the

nor was it determined that

truthful

itself

given

was

1-.\

the

The tip concerning Grif-

who

information,

given

tip

gun was

officer,

•

if

SUSplClOn

standard was not met in this case.
fin's

even

information

ambiguous;

it

in

the

simply

that petr "may have had" guns in his apartment.

-

past.
stated

I agree that this information, standing alone, provides
a

questionable

basis

for

the

search.

Nevertheless,

w~
~h.-

the

~

courts below found that the tip met the "reasonable grounds"

/-t....J2_

~"f<-4_
lj

~ .....

~

~~~~

12.

standard,
here.

and

there

is

no

reason

to

disturb

for

the

probation officer

Moreover,

word.
tion

finding

The police officer who took the tip had enough confi-

dence in the information to pass it on,
able

that

gathered

by probation officers
be

in

second-hand data.

It

ability

their

same

type

perform
of

rely on the

policeman's

it seems likely that most of the informa-

they supervise will

to

to

and it was reason-

source

the

would

form

concerning

of anonymous

interfere

jobs

the

with

the

if

this

Court

verification

from

probation

people

tips

and

officers'

requires

the

officers

that it requires of the police.

III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
Wisconsin has created a detailed statutory system that
allows warrantless searches of probationers' homes based on
l ...

a probation officers reasonable suspicion that a person possesses contraband.

I

l-1

\l

1

-------

-=-

-

given the unique status of

the probationers and the specific need to supervise closely
committed crimes.

probation officers be

required

I

would prefer

to obtain a

that

warrant

of

4th

amendment

protections.

Accordingly,

I

suggest

~

I

,.
-

0

recommend that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme

Court be affirmed in part and reversed in part.

-

1.-t..,

~

., ......,__~~

before ~

that the decision below be reversed to the extent it allows
warrantless searches.

~,.,

the ~

searching, given that a home is entitled to the highest level

/1-~

agree that probable cause should not ~~d-4.

be required for these searches,

those who have

s f..d;:tt_.;

11

April 16, 1987

To:

Justice

From:

Andy

Re:

86-5324, Griffin v. Wisconsin; supplement to the bench
memo (to be argued Monday, April 20, 1987).

In looking over you comments on my bench memo in this case,
I noticed that I was not clear in explaining my recommendation.

____

I concluded tbat probation __....,
officials did not need probable cause
to search a probationer's home, but that it nevertheless might be
preferable to retain the warrant requirement.

You wondered

whether it was rational to require a warrant, since in virtually
all of our cases warrants can only issue on a showing of probable
cause.
My recommendation was based largely on an analogy to
()

hf~arshall

-----

v.

~arlow's,

436

u.s.

407 (1978).

In that case the

Court . refused to permit warrantless searches of business premises
by OSHA inspectors.

We retained the warrant requirement even

though the standard needed to justify the search was only
II

reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.

I though that the same

requirements could be applied to Griffin: protect the
government's interest by permitting it to search based on
reasonable suspicion, but protect the probationer from abusive
searches by demanding that the officials get an administrativetype warrant.

I have done more research since writing the bench memo.
Although in some ways

I

still think it would be useful to keep a

"reasonable suspicion" warrant requirement,

I

realize that Barlow

has not been widely cited as a new approach to analyzing these
cases.

I think it would probably create confusion to separate

the warrant requirement from probable cause, and would require
non-police officers to develop expertise in an area that already
is quite complex.

So rather than affirm in part and reverse in

part as recommended before,

I

now recommend that the decision of

the Wisconsin S. Ct. be affirmed in full.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-5324

JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN
[June - , 1987]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his
home searched by probation officers acting without a warrant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis
of Griffin's conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We
granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1986), to consider
whether this search violated the Fourth Amendment.
I

On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previouslY b~n
convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court
of resistmg arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an
officer. He was placed on probation.
Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the
State Department of Health and Social Services. Sec.
973.10(1), Wis. Stats. (1985). That law also provides that
"imposition of probation ... shall subject the defendant to
. . . conditions set by the court and rules and regulations
established by the department." Ibid. One of the Department's regulations permits any probation officer to search a
probatione?Shome without a warrant as long as his su ervisor approves and as1 ong as there are ' easona e ground ' to
believe there is contraband-including any Item t at the probationer cannot possess under the probation conditions-in

__ ... 1'111.. ~

f(..affv----
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the home. §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1), Wis. Adm. Code. 1 The
rule directs an officer to consider a variety of factors in determining whether "reasonable grounds" exist, among which are
information provided by an informant, the reliability and
specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant
(including whether the informant has any incentive to supply
inaccurate information), the officer's own experience with the
probationer, and the "need to verify compliance with rules of
supervision and state and federal law." § 328.21(7). Another regulation makes it a violation of the terms of probation
to refuse to consent to a home search. § 328.04(3)(k). And
still another forbids a probationer to possess a firearm
without advance approval from a probation officer.
§ 328.04(3)(j).
On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation,
Michael Lew, the supervisor1 of Griffin's probation officer,
received information from a detective' on the Beloit Police
Department tha! there were Qr m1ght be guns in Griffin's
apartment. Unaole to secure the assistance of Griffin's own
probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation
officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who
they were and informed him that they were going to search
his home. During the subsequent search-carried out entirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wisconsin's probation regulations-they found a handgun.
Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which is itself a ~elo~ . Sec. 941.29(2), Wis.
Stats. (1986). He moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the search. The trial court denied the motion, con'Section HSS 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effective on January 1, 1982. Effective May 1, 1986, Section HSS 328.21 was
repealed and repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and without relevant substantive changes. See Gr1tfin v. State, 388 N. W. 2d 535,
542 n. 7 (Wis. 1986). This opinion will cite the old version of § 328.21,
which was in effect at the time of the search.
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eluding that no warrant was necessary and that the search
was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the firearms violation, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, State v. Griffin, 376 N. W. 2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again affirmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper because probation diminishes a grobationer's reasonable expectat!Qp. of_wi,yacy-so that a probation officer may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home
without a warrant, and with only "reasonable grounds" (not
probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It
held that the "reasonable grounds" standard of Wisconsin's
search regulation satisfied this "reasonable grounds" standard of the federal Constitution, and that the detective's tip
established. "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the
regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to
supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin,
and suggested a need to verify Griffin!s compliance with state
law. State v. Griffin, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 539-544 (1986).
II
We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly con- ,
eluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it un?
necessar to emBrace the new princlpleof la tTiat court
adopte_!L Griffin a
een conv1c e o a crime, and the
search was carried out pursuant to a regulation promulgated
by the corrections officials to whose custody he had been
committed. It is enough to find that regulation valid under
the analysis our cases have applied to other regulations allegedly infringing the constitutional rights of those lawfully
remanded to the custody of corrections officials.

A
With regard to those convicted of crimes and sentenced to
prison, the Court has long recognized that, although not all
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constitutional protections are forfeit, Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520, 545 (1979), some constitutional rights are significantly limited, not only as an inevitable consequence of incarceration but also to enable corrections authorities reasonably
to pursue such valid objectives as rehabilitation and security.
Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822-823 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U. S. 392, 412-413 (1974). "There must be," we have
said, "mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives" and constitutional rights, Wolffv. McDaniel,
418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974), including, perhaps most obviously,
rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish,
supra, at 555-560 (upholding jail policy requiring unannounced "shakedown" inspections and strip searches). And
we have held, therefore, that a prison regulation is not to be
judged under the "heightened scrutiny" usually applied to
alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights,
but instead under a standard of "reasonableness," Turner v.
Safley, - - U. S. - --, - - (1987), validating the regulation "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1987) (quoting Turner, at --).
We think this mode of analysis (though not, of course, the
precise results it produces) equally applicable to regulations
that allegedly impinge on the constitutional rights of probationers. ~robation, like prison, is "a form of criminal sanc- ~
tion imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty." G. Killinger et al., Probation and
Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976). Probation
is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on
a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary
confinement in a maximum security facility to a few hours of
mandatory community service. A number of different options lie between those extremes, including confinement in a
medium or minimum security facility, work-release programs, "halfway houses," and probation-which can itself be
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more or less confining depending upon the number and severity of restrictions imposed. To a greater or lesser degree,
however, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it
to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy "the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 480 (1972).
As already noted, Griffin was committed to the legal custody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social
Services, and was made "subject ... to ... rules and regulations established by the department." Sec. 973.10(1), Wis.
Stats. (1985). The corrections officials of that department
pursue many of the same objectives as the corrections officials of a prison system, including rehabilitation and protection of the community. See State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady,
240 N. W. 2d 626, 633 (Wis. 1976) (discussing objectives of
parole). We see no reason why the same considerations that
induced us to adopt a "reasonableness" standard for assessing
the constitutionality
regulab qns promUigated by prison
officials would not call for a similar standard here-considerations ranging from separation·of powers and federalism c.Qg~ to an· appropriate respect for the expert judgment of
corrections officials with regard to the needs of the penal system. See, e. g., Turner, at--; O'Lone, at--; Procunier
v. Martinez, supra, at 405; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U. S. 119, 137 (1977) (Burger, C. J.,
concurring).
The "reasonableness" standard, of course, automatically
takes account of relevant differences that exist between probation and prison confinement. Even in the prison context
alone, we have recognized that this standard produces varying results depending upon "the nature of the regime to
which [prisoners] have been lawfully committed." Wolff v.
McDaniel, supra, at 556. See O'Lone, at - - (restriction
upon religious liberty reasonable in light of outdoor-work

or
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regimen dictated by crowded conditions in particular prison);
Turner, at - - (inmate mail restrictions justified by existence of convict gangs in particular prison system). Thus,
some prison regulations we have approved will not be constitutionally applicable to probationers. It is difficult to
envision, for example, circumstances that would validate, in
the probation context, the restrictions on inmate mail we upheld in Turner. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 483
(1972) (holding that due process requires limited hearing before parole may be revoked since, although parolee is formally "in custody," summary decisionmaking is not as important in that setting as in prison).
B

Having determined that the r~asonableness analysis set
forth in Turner and O'Lone provides the proper framework,
we turn to its application to the facts of the present case.
The manner of that analysis has been as follows: As a thresh:old matter, we have required that the regulation at issue
have "a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it." O'Lone, at-- (citing Turner, at
--). If it does, we have proceeded to a consideration of
the proportionality between, on the one hand, the nature and
degree of restriction upon the prisoner's liberty and, on the
other, the importance of that restriction to the public interest. With regard to the latter, we have accorded considerable deference to the "considered judgment" of corrections
officials, O'Lone, a t - - (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
562); see also Turner, at - - , though we have not been prepared to ignore the existence of "obvious, easy alternatives"
to their restrictive policies, O'Lone, at-- (quoting Turner,
at-).
In applying this mode of ana)ysis here, we must of course
take the regulation as it has been interpreted by state correctio'i'rs officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wisconsi n Supreme Court-the ultimate authority on issues of
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Wisconsin law-has held that a tip from a police detective
that Griffin "had" or "may have had" an illegal weapon at his
home constituted "reasonable grounds" under the regulation.
See 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we would choose
to interpret a similarly worded federal regulation in that
fashion, we are bound by the state court's interpretation,
which is relevant to our constitutional analysis only insofar as
it fixes the meaning of the regulation. 2
Whatever may be the outer limits established by our
"reasonablen~s'' test fo~f corrections
official:S're~, Wisconsin's search re lation is well
wit~~m. Permitting searc es on "reasonable grounds"
(even as Wisconsin has defined them) obviously has a logical
connection to the quite legitimate objective of assuring that
the probationer is complying with the terms of his probation,
including the requirement that he not violate other Wisconsin
laws, thereby assuring that the probation serves as a period
of genuine rehabilitation, and that the community is not
harmed by the probationer's being at large. Pursuit of this
objective justifies the State in exercising a degree of surveillance and supervision over probationers beyond what it can
properly apply to others who are not incarcerated. We
must, therefore, determine whether there is a reasonable
2

If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which
the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty-e. g., a restriction on
his movements-the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatural an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to provide adequate notice. Cf. Kolendet· v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358
(1983); Lambert v. CaLU'ornia, 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an
issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his probation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to
consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS 328.04(3)(k),
nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised, at the
time of the request for search, what the probation officer's "reasonable
grounds" were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the
grounds for "probable cause" or "exigent circumstances" searches before
they may be undertaken.

I

?
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proportionality between the burden of the restriction Wisconsin's search regulation imposes upon normal civil liberties
and (giving due weight to the considered judgment of Wisconsin's corrections officials) its utility in furthering the goal
of Wisconsin's probation system.
Wisconsin's search regulations bring the probationer's
righti
sth
S
o s e which ordinary citizens enjoy in two respect . Fir
they dispense with the warrant requirement
that is
· arily a conO!tiott of F'ourth AmendmeiR reasonableness. See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,
586 (1980). That requirement would obviously interfere to
an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up
a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of
how close a supervision the probationer requires. By way of
analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial authority· would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for
search of a minor child's room. And on the other side of the
equation-the effect of dispensing with a warrant upon the
probationer: Although a probation officer is not an impartial
magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen. He is an employee of the State De artment of Health and So
erv1ces
who,
e assure y charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the
pro~go~r (who ui tfie regufad ons is called a "client," HSS
§ 32 . 3(5)). The applicable regulations require him, for example, to "[p]rovid[e] individualized counseling designed to
foster growth and development of the client as necessary,"
HSS § 328.04(2)(i), and "[m]onitor[] the client's progress
where services are provided by another agency and evaluat[e] the need for continuation of the services," HSS
§ 328.04(2)(o). In such a setting, we think it reasonable to
dispense with the warrant re uir ment.
The econ
in which the Wisconsin regulation
mary Fourth Amendment requirements is
dispenses W1
that it demands only a standard of "reasonable grounds" to

I

L_

~

-

~

J

~
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justify a search. That lies somewhere between the standard
of "probable cause" that citizens who are not under senten ce
for crime enJoy, and the standard of no cause that we have
implicitly approvedTn the prison context , se?! Bell v. Wolfiish,
supra, at 555-557 (approving random "shakedown"
searches); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their
prison cells). It is most unlikely that the unauthenticated tip
of a police officer-bearing, as far as the record shows, no
indication whether its basis was first-hand knowledge or, if
not, whether the first-hand source was reliable, and merely
stating that Griffin "had or might have" guns in his residence,
not that he certainly had them-would support the issuance
of a warrant in an ordinary case. Once again, however, this
is not an ordinary case, by reason of the continuing relationship that exists between the probation agency and the probationer. The principal difference is well reflected in the regulation specifying what is to be considered "[i]n deciding
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe ... a client's living quarters or property contain contraband," HSS
§ 328.21(7). The factors include not only the usual elements
that a police officer or ~ag!st;ate would consider, such as the
detail and consistency of the information suggesting the presence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dissemble of the informant, HSS § 328.21(7)(c), (d); but also
"[i]nformation provided by the client which is relevant to
whether the c ient possesses contra an ,' an " t]he experien~~client or in a similar circumstance." HSS §328.21(7)(f), (g). We deal with a situation,
in other words, in which there is an ~ng~tionship-
and one that is not, or at least not entirefy, adversarial-between the object of the search and the decisionmaker.
In such circumstances it is both unrealistic, and destructive
of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship,
to insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of
particular items of supporting data, and upon the same de-
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gree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts.
The probation agency must be able to proceed on the basis of
its entire experience with the probationer, and to assess
probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, character
and circumstances. This kind of personal evaluation is
reviewable only with great difficulty, if at all, by courts of
law. To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it
reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer,
whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge, to support a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested
by the fact that the police may be unwilling to disclose their
confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same
reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate
the law, we think it enough if the information provided indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood ("had or might have
gun;;") of facts justifying the search.
Finally, we see no readily available alternative to warrantless searches based on reasonable grounds (as that term has
been interpreted by Wisconsin corrections officials and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in the circumstances of this case)
that would as effectively accomplish the purposes of the probation system. Accordingly, we conclude that the regulation as applied satisfies the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.

*

*

*

The search of Griffin's residence was "reasonable" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. This conclusion makes it-;;nnecessary to consider
whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any
search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is lawful
when there are "reasonable grounds" to believe contraband is
present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
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vote at Conference.

The result is consistent with your

The reasoning is quite broad in places: he

says, for example, that the "reasonableness" standard applies to
any type of regulation imposed on anyone who has been committed
to the custody of the state AG,

regardless of whether the

defendant is in jail, on probation, parole, or work-release.
Ultimately, however, his holding is narrow.

He simply decides

that this particular search was permissible because it was
conducted pursuant to a valid state regulation.

He does not hold

that any warrantless search of a probationer's home will be
considered reasonable in the absence of a regulation.
I

have other, minor quibbles about the way the opinion is

written (see, e.g., the analogy at the middle of page 8), but
they are not worth fighting about.

Unless you are concerned

about the scope of the opinion, I recommend that you join.
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Justice Powell
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Andy

Re:
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You might recall that we discussed this case briefly after
Justice Scalia circulated his draft opinion.
~

At the time you

were uneasy about the analysis, although satisfied with the

d _,-result.

The outcome is consistent with your Conference vote

it is permissible for a state statute to allow the warrantless
search of a probationers home.

But as you noted, parts of the

analysis are quite broad.
Justice Scalia's states that any person who is serving a
sentence for a crime may be required to relinquish his
constitutional rights if there is a "reasonable" connection
between a state penological interest and the restriction.

He

arrives at this conclusion by looking to our "prisoners' rights"
cases such as Turner v. Safley (Justice O'Connor's opinion from
this term that you joined).

Justice Scalia reasons that since we

give great deference to the warden on how to run the prison, we
logically should give similar deference to parole officials,
probation officers, or any other official responsible for
punishment and rehabilitation.

Of course, the

~

of

restriction that is considered reasonable will vary according the
degree of "confinement" to which you are subject -- the mail
restriction upheld in Safley would be unreasonable if applied to

a person on parole -- but Justice Scalia concludes that the
standard for evaluation constitutional deprivations should be the
same regardless of whether the person is sentenced to perform
community service or is confined in Attica.
There are two problems with this approach.
not logically follow that we

sho~ld

First, it does

lower the standard of

scrutiny for probationers simply because we do so for prisoners.
One reason we are willing to give such great deference to wardens
is that prisons are a unique, self-contained society, and judges
are ill-suited for making the day-to-day decisions necessary to
run them.

People on probation, however, are by definition part

of the mainstream; judges are more capable of deciding whether a
warrantless search is necessary for probationers than for
prisoners, and thus there is less reason for deferring to

-------....

-----

corrections officials.

--

In fact, because the "reasonableness"

--......__

standard is an exception to the usual rule of strict scrutiny, a
strong argument could be made that Justice Scalia has swept too
broadly in establishing a standard for all convicts that
originally was intended to apply only in prisons.
The

c~pe- 0~ t~

is the second problem.

we have

not considered a great number of similar cases involving
constitutional deprivations of non-prisoners convicted of crimes
(perhaps they just don't arise), but taken to extremes, Justice
Scalia's opinion would apply to all deprivations of any
constitutional rights for anyone in the custody of the AG.
Ultimately, this may prove to be the logical rule, but it is not
necessary to go that far immediately.

This case only involves

the 4th amendment rights of a probationer; the narrowest opinion
would find that the 4th amendment has less application to
---~
probationers because of the special need to monitor their

-----

behavior.

This narrow approach is less satisfying, in that it

does not clarify a whole area of law, but it may be more prudent.
Recommendation: Having said. this, I realize that my concerns
are quite theoretical, and may be better resolved in law reviews
rather than the

u.s.

Reports.

Because you agree with the result,

I think you safely can join Justice Scalia's opinion.
the moment, the better course may be to wait.
cler~s

But for

Justice O'Connor's

are concerned about this case, and she may be planning to

write separately to address the issues mentioned above.

-

If she

does write (I hope to find out from her clerks as soon as they
know), I would recommend that you wait to see what she has to
say.

If she decides not to write, we then can decide whether to

add a few words of our own or simply join.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that the probation condition at
issue in this case satisfies the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and accordingly concur in the judgment. I disagree, however, that the standard adopted in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S.-- (1987) is apposite here. It is true, of j ~ A..--1-~
course, that this case, like Turner, involves constitutional
, ~/-: A. ~ ~...M .A
claims by those who have been convicted of crimes andreL--1...,.-'\ ~-\....·
manded to custody of the executive branch. Unlike Turner, ()j. ~
~
however, this case does not involve the kind o mstitutwnaf '
concerns raised by the "operational . . . realities of running "tt- ~ -1
a penal institution." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
v {
Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 126 (1977). These considerA.. ~ •
ations were an important reason for the standard adopted in
Turner, supra, at - - , and in my view their absence makes
that decision inapt to the question at hand.
p~ · 56t:.--6
Better authority, in my view, for the conclusion reached by
the Court today is the balancing test announced in Camara v.
~
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and recently applied
by this Court in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. - - (1987) ~ . ~Us
and New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325 (1985). In concluding that Camara's balancing analysis offers the most ap~~
propriate framework for considering the Fourth Amendment
claims of those on probation, I would follow !._h~p ~~~
fU2. 4.) £73 .
parently taken by the upreme Court O!WiSconsin in · this
case, see 388 N.· W. 2d 535
86 , an w1dely supported by
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other courts and commentators. See, e. g., 4 W. LaFave,
Search an~.10(c), pp. 136-142 (2d ed. 1987);
White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 167 (1969); Note, Extending
Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22
Stan. L. Rev. 129, 137-140 (1969); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.
2d 246 (CA9 1975) (en bane); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F. 2d 259 (CA9 1975) (en bane); State v. Earnest,
293 N. W. 2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1980). The view of these authorities is that a re~eig:hing_of~heE_a~ce of individual and
societal interests is appropnateinilglitoh1le0ilg01'iig supervisiorrandregulation of probationers and parolees in society.
Under this test, although probable cause is generally required for any search or seizure, a different standard may be
appropriate "'[w]here a careful balancing of governmental
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best
served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness
that stops short of probable cause.'" O'Connor v. Ortega,
supra, at - - (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. 0., supra, at
341).
Considering first the government's legitimate needs, few
would disagree that there is a great public interest in close
supervision of those on probatiorl."" According to a recent
RAND study of probation in California, for example, over
half of the persons on probation for felony convictions were
charged with new crimes within 40 months of being sentenced, and almost two-thirds were rearrested within the
same period. Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49
Fed. Probation 4, 5 (June 1985). Moreover, over half of
those on probation were reconvicted, with 18% convicted of
homicide, rape, weapons offenses, assault, or robbery. ld.,
at 6. Probation-which was "originally intended for offenders who pose little threat to society and were believed to be
capable of rehabilitation through a productive, supervised life
in the community," id., at 4-is increasingly used even for
those convicted of serious felonies. Over one-third of the
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Nation's adult probation population consists of those convicted of felonies, and the probation population is growing
more rapidly than the prison population. Ibid. Accordingly, there is a special public interest in maintaining a system of close supervision of those on probation.
Probation supervision would be substantially more difficult, if possible at all, under a rule requiring probation
officers to have both probable cause and a warrant before
conducting a search to ensure compliance with probation conditions. Some potential violations of probation conditionssuch as possession of drugs or firearms in violation of the conditions of probation-can only be detected by searches of the
probationer's person or home. In some cases, moreover, a
reduced standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is
necessary to permit early intervention before a probationer
does damage to himself or society. Indeed, recent research
suggests that more intensive supervision ·of those on probation can significantly reduce recidivism. I d., at 9. In
Camara, this Court refused to require probable cause in the
traditional sense because "the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all
structures." 387 U. S., at 535-536. Some probation conditions likewise can be effectively enforced only if probation officers are permitted to act on evidence that may not satisfy
the probable-cause standard. The warrant requirement is
also ill-suited to probation searches. Such a requirement
would interfere with the ability of probation officials to react
quickly to evidence of misconduct, see T. L. 0. v. New Jersey; 469 U. S., at 340 (warrant requirement "would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools"), and the delay
occasioned by a warrant requirement could frustrate the
need for. an effective, credible deterrent. New York v. Burger,-- U. S. - - , - - (1987); United States v. Biswell,
406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972). Thus, "special needs, beyond the

..
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normal need for law enforcement make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable." 469 U. S., at 351
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment).
Balanced against this public need, of course, are the probationers' privacy interests. The instant case involves the
search of h~individuals' privacy interests are at
their greatest. Nonetheless, because of the supervisory nature of probation, a probationer has a lesser privacy interest
than other members of the public. A term of probation is
imposed instead of a term of imprisonment, see 18 U. S. C.
§ 3651 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09
(West 1985 and Supp. 1986), and in return, a probationer
must comply with often quite stringent conditions that belie
any claim to the de ee of rivacy shared by those not on probation. The £ eral probation statu , for example, auth<:>rizes an array o con itwns, me u mg: the obligation not 'to
commit another crime during the period of probation, the obligation to pursue employment, the duty to avoid certain
occupations, an obligation to avoid certain places or people, a
requirement that the probationer spend weekends or nights
in prison, a requirement that the probationer refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other
controlled substance. 18 U. S.C. §3563 (1982 ed., Supp.
III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987). In light of restrictions such as
these, probationers cannot legitimately expect the same degree of privacy as law-abiding citizens.
On balance, I conclude that the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness applied by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is appropriate in the probation context. I further
agree with the plurality and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
that the search in this case was reasonable. The search was
initiated by a supervisor in the State Bureau of Probation and
Parole after he received a telephone call from the local detective bureau. The supervisor testified that the detective who
called him "indicated that they had received information that
Mr. Griffin had in his possession at his residence contraband

I
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material." App. 51. Although this information would not
be adequate to support a finding of probable cause under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), in my view, it was reasonable for probation officials to rely on information provided
by law enforcement officials. As stated by the plurality, it
is essential that probation officials be able to proceed on the
basis of their entire experience with a probationer, and "it
[is] reasonable to permit information provided by a police
officer, whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge,
to support a probationer search." Ante, at 10. I therefore
concur in the judgment affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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86-5324

JOSEPH G. GRIFFIN, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN --- - - - - - - - - - - . _
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN
[June 26, 1987]

JusTICE ScALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his
home searched by probation officers acting without a warrant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis
of Griffin's conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We
granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to consider whether
this search violated the Fourth Amendment.
I

On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previously been
convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court
of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an
officer. He was placed on probation.
Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the
State Department of Health and Social Services and renders
them "subject to ... conditions set by the court and rules
and regulations established by the department." Wis. Stat.
§ 973.10(1) (1985). One of the Department's regulations permits any probation officer to search a probationer's home
without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as
long as there are "reasonable grounds" to believe the presence of contraband-including any item that the probationer
cannot possess under the probation conditions. Wis. Admin.

S.D.lc
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Code HHS §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981). 1 The rule provides
that an officer should consider a variety of factors in determining whether "reasonable ·grounds" exist, among which are
information provided by an informant, the reliability and
specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant
(including whether the informant has any incentive to supply
inaccurate information), the officer's own experience with the
probationer, and the "need to verify compliance with rules of
supervision and state and federal law." HHS § 328.21(7).
Another .regulation makes it a violation of the terms of
probation to refuse to consent to a home search. HHS
§ 328.04(3)(k). And still another forbids a probationer to
possess a firearm without advance approval from a probation
officer. HHS § 328.04(3)(j).
On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation,
Michael Lew, the supervisor of Griffin's probation officer,
received information from a detective on the Beloit Police
Department that there were or might be guns in Griffin's
_apartment. Unable to secure the assistance of Griffin's own
probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation
officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who
they were and informed him that they were going to search
his home. During the subsequent search-carried out entirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wisconsin's probation regulation-they found a handgun.
Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which is itself a felony. Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)
(Supp. 1986-1987). He moved to suppress the evidence
seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion,
' HSS § 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effective on
January 1, 1982. Effective .May 1, 1986, HSS § 328.21 was repealed and
repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and without relevant
substantive changes. See Griffin v. State, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 60, n. 7, 388
N. W. 2d 535, 542, n, 7 (1986). This opinion will cite the old version of
§ 328.21, which was in effect at the time of the search.
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concluding that no warrant was necessary and that the
search was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the firearms violation, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals, State v. Griffin, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 376 N. W. 2d 62
(1985).
On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper because probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy-so that a probation officer may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer's home
without a warrant, and with only "reasonable grounds" (not
probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It ·
held that the "reasonable grounds" standard of Wisconsin's
search regulation satisfied this "reasonable grounds" standard of the Federal Constitution, and that the detective's tip
established "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the
regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to
supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin,
and suggested a need to verify Griffin's compliance with state
law. State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 52-64, 388 N. W. 2d
535, 539-544 (1986).
II
We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law, as the Wisconsin court evidently did, that any search of a probationer's
home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment
as long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a
federal "reasonable grounds" standard. As his sentence for
the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed to the legal
custody of the Wiscom~in State Department of Health and Social Services, and thereby made subject to that department's
rules and regulations.
The search of Griffin's home satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was
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carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well
established principles.
A
A probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be "reasonable." Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by
probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be),
see, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980), we
have permitted exceptions when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v.
T. L . 0., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in
the judgment). Thus, we have held that government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-related searches of employees' desks and offices without probable cause, O'Connor v. Ortega, - - U. S. - - (1987), and
that school officials may conduct warrantless searches of
some student property, also without probable cause, New
Jersey v. T. L. 0., supra. We have also held, for similar
reasons, that in certain circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme
need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable cause requirements as long as their searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative standards." Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967). See New York v. Burger,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S.
594, 602 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 , 316
(1972).
A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents "special
needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Probation, like incarceration, is "a form of criminal
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sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict,
finding, or plea of guilty." G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P.
Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976); see also 18 U. S. C. § 3651 (9182 ed. and Supp.
III) (probation imposed instead of imprisonment); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 973.09 (West 1985 and Supp. 1986) (same). 2 Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of
points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from
solitary confinement in a maximum security facility to a few
hours of mandatory community service. A number of different options lie between those extremes, including confinement in a medium or minimum security facility, work-release
programs, "halfway houses," and probation-which can itself
be more or less confining depending upon the number and severity of restrictions imposed. See, e. g. , 18 U.S. C. §3563
(1982 ed. , Supp. III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987) (probation conditions authorized in federal system include requiring probationers to avoid commission of other crimes; to pursue employment; to avoid certain occupations, places, and people; to
spend evenings or weekends in prison; and to avoid narcotics
or excessive use of alcohol). To a greater or lesser degree, it
is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of
parolees) that they do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 , 480
(1972).
These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation
serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the com2
We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing
Constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are
"'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. ' " O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz,- U. S . - , (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U. S. - , - ·- (1987)). We have no occasion in this case to decide
whether, as a general matter, that test applies to probation regulations as
well.
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munity is not harmed by the probationer's being at large.
See State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 746, 653-654, 247 N. W. 2d
696, 700 (1976). These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact
observed. Recent research suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, see Petersilia, Probation
and Felony Offenders, 49 Fed. Probation 9 (June 1985), and
the importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of
serious crimes, see id., at 4. Supervision, then, is a "special
need" of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon
privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. That permissible degree is not unlimited, however, so we next turn to whether it has been exceeded here.
B

In determining whether the "special needs" of its probation
system justify Wisconsin's search regulation, we must take
that regulation as it has been interpreted by state corrections
officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court-the ultimate authority on issues of Wisconsin law-has held that a tip from a police detective that Griffin "had" or "may have had" an illegal weapon at his home
constituted the requisite "reasonable grounds." See 131
Wis. 2d, at 64, 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we
would choose to interpret a similarly worded federal regulation in that fashion, we are bound by the state court's interpretation, which is relevant to our constitutional analysis
only insofar as it fixes the meaning of the regulation. 3 We
3
If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which
the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty-e. g., a restriction on
his movements-the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatural an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to provide adequate notice. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358
(1983); Lambert v. California , 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an
issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his probation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to
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think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation
system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by "reasonable grounds," as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable
degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate
rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a
supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay
inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult
for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, see New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S., at 340, and
would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create, see New York v.
Burger, - - U. S. - - , - - (1987); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. By way of analogy, one might
contemplate how parental custodial authority would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor
child's room. And on the other side of the equation-the effect of dispensing with a warrant upon the probationer: Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches
against the ordinary citizen. He is an employee of the State
Department of Health and Social Services who, while assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also
supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer (who
in the regulations is called a "client," HSS § 328.03(5)). The
applicable regulations require him, for example, to "[p]rovid[e] individualized counseling designed to foster growth
and development of the client as necessary," HSS
consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS 328.04(3)(k),
nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised , at the
time of the request for search, what the probation officer's "reasonable
grounds" were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the
grounds for "probable cause" or "exigent circumstances" searches before
they may be undertaken.
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§ 328.04(2)(i), and "[m]onitor[] the client's progress where

services are provided by another agency and evaluat[e] the
need for continuation of the services," HSS § 328.04(2)(o).
In such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the
warrant requirement.
The dissent would retain a judicial warrant requirement,
though agreeing with our subsequent conclusion that reasonableness of the search does not require probable cause.
This, however, is a combination that neither the text of the
Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits. While it
is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands probable cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse
runs up against the constitutional provision that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable Cause." Amendment
IV. The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where
the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant,
it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause. Although we have arguably come to permit an exception to that
prescription for administrative warrants, 4 we have never
done so for judicial warrants. There it remains true that
"[i]f a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the
rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue." Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 373 (1959). The dissent neither
gives a justification for departure from that principle nor con' In the administrative search context, we formally require that administrative warrants be supported by "probable cause," because in that context we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but
merely to a requirement of reasonableness. See, e. g., Marshall v. Barlow's , Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 320 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court , 387
U. S. 523, 528 (1967). In other contexts, however, we use "probable
cause" to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search,
to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as "reasonable suspicion."
U. S . - , - (1987) (plurality); New JerSee O'Connor~·. Ortega, sey v. T. L . 0 ., 469 U. S. 325, 341-342 (1985). It is plainly in this sense
that the dissent uses the term. See, e. g., post, at 5 (less than probable
cause means "a reduced level of suspicion").
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siders its implications for the body of Fourth Amendment
law. 5
We think that the probation regime would also be unduly
disrupted by a requirement of probable cause. To take the
facts of the present case, it is most unlikely that the unauthenticated tip of a police officer-bearing, as far as the
record shows, no indication whether its basis was first-hand
knowledge or, if not, whether the first-hand source was reliable, and merely stating that Griffin "had or might have"
guns in his residence, not that he certainly had them-would
meet the ordinary requirement of probable cause. But this
is different from the ordinary case in two related respects:
First, even more than the requirement of a warrant, a probable cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of
the supervisory arrangement. The probationer would be assured that so long as his illegal (and perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no
more than reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected
and uncorrected. ·The second difference is well reflected in
the regulation specifying what is to be considered "[i]n deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to believe . . . a
client's living quarters or property contain contraband," HSS
§ 328.21(7). The factors include not ?nly the usual elements
5
Moreover, the dissent cannot, at the same time, proclaim as an absolute (absent a warrant or exigent circumstances) "the right of a man to retreat into his own home," post, at 6 (quoting from Silverman v. United
States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)), and yet deprecate the need for warrantless searches here on the ground that "a probation officer has the special
advantage of the authority to conduct home visits," and "[o]bservations
during such visits could provide reasonable suspicion and support a warrant or, under exigent circumstances, an immediate search." Post, at 8.
For one must also justify the authority to compel the probationer to host
warrantless "home visits" (a friendlier phrase, certainly, but hardly a different reality than "warrantless entries") and to permit the "observations"
they entail. The difference between us seems to be much more narrow
than the dissent believes, going, apparently, only to the scope of the warrantless search, with the dissent objecting only to one that is "full-blown,"
post, at 9.
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that a police officer or magistrate would consider, such as the
detail and consistency of the information suggesting the presence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dissemble of the informant, HSS §§ 328.21(7)(c), (d); but also
"[i]nformation provided by the client which is relevant to
whether the client possesses contraband," and "[t]he experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar circumstance." HSS §§ 328.21(7)(f), (g). As was true, then, in
O'Connor v. Ortega, supra, and New Jersey v. T. L. 0.,
supra, we deal with a situation in which there is an ongoing
supervisory relationship-and one that is not, or at least not
entirely, adversarial-between the object of the search and
the decisionmaker. 6
In such circumstances it is both unrealistic and destructive
of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship to
insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of
particular items of supporting data, and upon the same degree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts.
In some cases-especially those involving drugs or illegal
weapons-the probation agency must be able to act based
upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a
probationer does damage to himself or society. The agency,
moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire
6
It is irrelevant whether the probation authorities relied upon any peculiar knowledge which they possessed of the petitioner in deciding to conduct the present search. Our discussion pertains to the reasons generally
supporting the proposition that the search decision should be left to the expertise of probation authorities rather than a magistrate, and should be
supportable by a lesser quantum of concrete evidence justifying suspicion
than would be required to establish probable cause. That those reasons
may not obtain in a particular case is of no consequence. We may note,
nonetheless, that the dissent is in error to assert as a fact that the probation authorities made no use of special knowledge in the present case, post,
~t 12. All we know for certain is that the petitioner's probation officer
could not be reached; whether any material contained in petitioner's probation file was used does not appear.
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experience with the probationer, and to assess probabilities
in the light of its knowledge of his life, character and
circumstances.
To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer, 7
whether or not on the basis of first-hand knowledge, to support a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested
by the fact that the police may be unwilling to disclose their
confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same
reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate
the law, we think it enough if the information provided indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood ("had or might have
guns") of facts justifying the search. 8

*

*

*

The search of Griffin's residence was "reasonable" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider
7

The dissent speculates that the information might not have come from
the police at all, "but from someone impersonating an officer." Post, at 10.
The trial court, however, found as a matter of fact that Lew received the
tip on which he relied from a police officer. See 388 N. W. 2d, at 543.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that finding, ibid., and neither the
petitioner nor the dissent asserts that it is clearly erroneous.
8
The dissent asserts that the search did not comport with all the governing Wisconsin regulations. There are reasonable grounds on which the
Wisconsin court could find that it did. But we need not belabor those
here, since the only regulation upon which we rely for our constitutional
decision is that which permits a warrantless search on "reasonable
grounds." The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the requirement of "reasonable grounds" to have been met on the facts of this case and, as discussed earlier, we hold that such a requirement, so interpreted, meets constitutional minimum standards as well. That the procedures followed,
although establishing "reasonable grounds" under .Wisconsin law, and adequate under federal constitutional standards, may have violated Wisconsin
state regulations, is irrelevant to the case before us.
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whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any
search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is lawful
when there are "reasonable grounds" to believe contraband is
present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
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June 24, 1987
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Dear Nino:
Please join me in your alternate draft of June 23rd.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Scalia
cc:

The Conference

,jltpftntt

<lfonrl Df tltt ~ttb ,jtalts

J':tsqinghtn. ~. <!f.

2llp'l-~

CHAMISERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 24, 1987

Re:

86-5324 - Griffin v. Wisconsin

Dear Nino:
Please join me in your alternate draft of June 23rd.
Sincerely,

i~

Justice Scalia
cc:

The Conference
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JUSTICE: ANTONIN SCALIA

June 24, 1987
Re:

86-5324 - Griffin v. Wisconsin

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In response to Harry's revised dissent, I will add the
indicated new language and additional footnote call to the
sentence beginning on line 17 of page 8 of my June 26 draft:
Although we have arguably come to permit an exception
to that prescription for administrative search
warrants, 4/ which ma
but do not necessarii
to
be, issued-by courts
/, we ave never one
or
constitutionally manAated j'udicial warrants.
The new footnote

~/

will read as follows:

See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 u.s., at 307
("We hold that ... the Act is unconstitutional insofar
as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant
or its equivalent"). The "neutral magistrate," Camara,
supra, 387 u.s., at 532, or "neutral officer," Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S., at 323, envisioned
by our administrative search cases is not necessarily
the "neutral judge," post, at 7, envisioned by the
dissent.
I will make no other substantive changes.
Sincerely,

86-5324 Griffin v. Wisconsin (Andy)
AS for the Court 5/4/87
1st draft 6/1/87
2nd draft 6/12/87
Alternate draft 6/23/87
3rd draft 6/25/87
Joined by CJ 6/3/87
SOC joins alternate draft 6/24/87
BRW 6/24/87
LFP 6/24/87
SOC concurring in the judgment
1st draft 6/16/87
2nd draft 6/18/87
BRW concurring in the judgment
1st draft 6/16/87
HAB dissenting
1st draft 6/20/87
1st alternative draft 6/24/87
2nd alternative draft 6/25/87
JPS joins Part I and IIC 6/22/87
TM 6/24/87
JPS joins Part I(C) 6/24/87
WJB joins Part liB and IIC 6/24/87
JPS dissenting
1st draft 6/23/87
Joined by TM 6/24/87
HAB will dissent 6/2/87
TM awaiting dissent 6/2/87
JPS awaiting dissent 6/2/87

